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26 December 1962

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

- 1. On 24 December Mr. Earman told me that in a phone conversation with Bromley Smith relative to delivery of a copy of the Cuban crisis report to McGeorge Bundy in Boston, Bromley Smith had said that Bundy wanted a copy as soon as possible and that he would read it and bring it back with him on Tuesday night, the 25th, giving us his comments Wednesday morning, the 26th. In the meantime we were to get a copy to Mr. Gilpatric, General Carroll, and Mr. Hilsman and that there would be no distribution to anyone else, to include Coyne, Killian, or any "outsiders." I told Mr. Earman I would address myself to this problem and for him to continue on the instructions he had already been given by the Director.
- 2. I subsequently talked to Mr. Bromley Smith and told him that we had sent a copy of the report up to Bundy -- that Carroll and Hilsman would automatically get copies since they were on the steering committee, that Gilpatric was not in the act and we would not furnish him a copy, that we would furnish Coyne a copy of the finished work on Wednesday morning, and that the rest of the copies for the President's committee would be given to Coyne on noon Wednesday. I told him that this was the Director's report and not a report of the entire administration and that we were responding to a request of the President's Board. Bromley Smith indicated that this was not in accordance with Mr. Bundy's instructions and I said that I realized this but felt it was the only way to handle the problem.
- 3. This morning, Wednesday the 26th, Mr. Bundy called me on the phone and told me that he had been through the report and that he thought it was a pretty adequate job. He further said he had some marginalia but nothing too substantive and that there were a number of places where he might have phrased things differently. I reviewed for him our distribution plans and he said in view of this,

he would consider himself having been furnished an advance copy purely for information purposes and he would not inject himself into the problem at this time. (A more complete set of notes on this conversation is available if required.)

> Marshall S. Carter Lieutenant General, USA Acting Director

NOTE: The actions I took in my conversation with Bremley Smith were not taken in ignorance of the Director's views.

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